Ukraine's War of Independence, Vol. II
Ukraine's War of Independence, Vol. II
Annotated link post: Sep-Nov 2022
This is an annotated link post of my open source analysis of the war in Ukraine since Vladimir Putin issued his mobilization decree. Volume I, covering February to September, is included at the bottom. Volume II is now closed to reflect that the Battle of Kherson has ended and a new, winter phase of the war has begun in earnest.
24 September. Putin wanted the war to be over by now. He would like it to not be news anymore, since it is not going well. Now that manpower shortages have forced him to mobilize Russian society, it is impossible to remove Ukraine from the news. It is the news. There is no other news in Russia, anymore.
26 September. Although the videos coming from Dagestan are certainly inspiring, Putin’s mobilization decree is unlikely to cause a split or a violent rebellion. Battlefield defeats will happen before that happens.
6 October. Military observers have scratched their heads about this seeming futility, but the violent ambitions of Yevgeny Prigozhin are an elegant explanation.
7 October. Electromagnetic spectrum operations (EMSO) is a distinct domain of weaponry that can be supplied to Ukraine with less risk than tanks or missiles or planes while still providing a vital force multiplier for those systems that Ukraine already has. Since the invasion resumed in February, otherwise-reluctant partners have waged a quiet, but important electromagnetic proxy war with Russia.
8 October. Given how thin Russian forces are stretched now, it makes sense for Kyiv to try another offensive. If they succeed, they can spend the whole winter picking Russian forces apart in Crimea to set the stage for victory.
14 October. As predicted by many oberservers, including this writer, Russian mobilization came far too late and has been much too disorganized to succeed in generating the level of combat power necessary to stop Ukraine.
20 October. Looming defeat in Kherson Oblast has been a topic of open discussion on Telegram and is now accepted as a matter of course on Russian television. Defeat is totally normal in Kherson, already, and therefore no threat to the regime, or to Putin’s power.
27 October. The Wagner Line is a visual showcase of Prigozhin himself — a form of nonverbal communication with Russians, a totem of his resolve to carry on with Vladimir Putin’s Russianizing project in Ukraine, come what may.
9 November. One day after midterm elections in the United States failed to produce a strong antiwar party in Congress, Russia has announced withdrawal of forces from the right bank of the Dnipro in Kherson Oblast.