Ukraine Has An Attrition Strategy of Their Own in Crimea and Kherson
Ukraine Has An Attrition Strategy of Their Own in Crimea and Kherson
An epic Russian defeat looms
Using precision long-range weapons, Ukraine has trapped a Russian army on the northern bank of the Dnipro and cut their logistical lifelines crossing that river. Footage of one strike shows secondary explosions along the Antonivsky Bridge (see above screengrab; video is embedded below). There are reports that a supply column of Russian troops, equipment, ammunition, and fuel was crossing at the time. If true, it means the Ukrainians are choosing not just the targets, but their strike timing, and they enjoy total surveillance of enemy movements.
That matters because Ukraine does not have the artillery ratio of guns to maneuver units that Russia does. While the Ukrainian Army and Territorial Defense Force have mobilized to impressive strength, so that even Russia now quietly admits they are out-numbered by a smaller country, Ukraine still lacks the abundant machinery of war their enemy enjoys. In order to win, Ukraine must do more with less, as seen here. As I have noted several times recently, irregulars — partisans, “special forces,” etc — are another key component of this “deep campaign.”
Worse for Russia, observers note from the video of the bridge strike that Russian air defenses attempted to intercept the incoming GMLRS rockets by firing their own surface-to-air missiles on “a pre-set course and with a timed fuze,” rather like World War II flak shells, but with even less effect. A lot of us have been saying that something is really, truly broken with Russian tactical air defense platforms that were sold as missile interceptors. That view has been vindicated on video.
Following three weeks of reported looting in Kherson City, Russian command staff and their families have now evacuated from the right bank of the Dnipro for the southern, or left bank. Such movements would not go unremarked at the Kremlin. It seems the entire chain of command has realized that Kherson is a deathtrap and conceived the necessity of a secondary line of defense along the Dnipro itself. Who will be left to defend it is anybody’s guess.
Russian defeat doctrine normally calls for massed fires against everything in sight as forces withdraw behind the curtain of fire. There were reports of increased artillery fire on various fronts Monday. This preference for punitive bombardment was on display during the withdrawal from Kyiv and Chernhiv, for example. It has a certain brute force logic.
But precision targeting of ammunition dumps have reduced their ability to do this, so every Russian counterattack on the north bank is now a suicide mission in lieu of a massed fire mission. Sooner or later, Russian soldiers will figure this out.
Whereas the Ukrainian problem is lack of material, not manpower, Russia has had the opposite problem so far. The motley collection of units inside the Kherson pocket includes most of Russia’s best remaining troop formations. Losing them would be a genuine disaster. No significant offensive operations would be possible for Moscow anywhere, any time soon. Any defeat here will be a devastating blow.
Western inventories have plenty of bridging equipment and Poland is a perfect training area for Ukrainians to learn combat bridge operations. If they can roll up the Russian forces on the northern bank and then cross the river in force, they can be at the gates of Crimea in a matter of weeks. At the very least, they can seize control of the water and electricity supply to the peninsula, leaving the Russian position there exrtremely difficult to maintain.
Of course, that would be the ideal vision of an offensive, but it is not clear that Ukraine intends to retake Kherson and Crimea so much as make Russia abandon them. One potential model for the operation underway right now is Snake Island, a Ukrainian victory made possible by western long-range artillery weapons and antiship missiles without a single Ukrainian touching dirt.
Consider the still-mysterious campaign unfolding in Crimea. Last week, Saki airbase experienced a series of explosions that destroyed or damaged a large number of Russian warplanes. Yesterday, a large ammunition depot in Dzhankoiskyi District exploded and burned for several hours, along with the nearby transformer substation that powers a train from Crimea into Kherson Oblast. An airfield near Hvardiiske was also hit.
None of this is coming from long-range artillery or missiles, however. Like the still-unexplained attack last month on a Russian naval ceremony, Ukraine is not claiming direct responsibility or explaining how they did it. Russians are also mum, which is a good sign they have still not put it all together, either.
I am going to venture a guess here that Ukraine infiltrated operatives into Crimea during the summer vacation season, and that they are making their getaways by joining the streams of tourist refugees leaving over the Kerch Strait bridge — which Ukraine can apparently destroy any time they please, but have not yet, because they want Russians to be able to leave Crimea.
So this might not be a traditional “offensive,” exactly. President Zelenskyy is calling it “the de-militarization of Crimea” and that could euphemistically describe the outline of his intentions. That is, everything and everyone Russian in Kherson or Crimea is a target for “de-militarization” by drone, missile, or improvised device.
Knock-on effects are already apparent. As the Institute for the Study of War explains, the redeployment of BTGs (battalion tactical groups) to Kherson Oblast over the last month has depleted force levels in the east, where Russia had seen slow, but steady progress since April. Emphasis mine:
The high concentration of volunteer battalions around Izyum and Slovyansk suggests that that area is not a focus of Russian attention and may be vulnerable to Ukrainian counterattacks. The congeries of forces in and around Kherson Oblast may pose significant challenges to Russian command and control, especially if Ukrainian forces press a counteroffensive there.
This week’s “deep strike” on the Wagner Group headquarters in Popasna, where the private military contractor is increasingly in charge of the war for Luhansk, points to more general Ukrainian ambitions. In a very real sense, the entire Russian Army is pinned to Kherson right now and the only questions are when, and in what state, they extract themselves from the situation. Defeat could spread with catastrophic speed if they do not.
Options remain. For example, Russians could use their pontoon ferries to withdraw from the right bank of the Dnipro and call it another “goodwill gesture.” Precipitous retreat might leave enough experienced fighters to hold the left bank and stabilize the situation in the east..
However, Vladimir Putin is not interested in any economy of lives. He has doubled down, and will likely insist on defending Kherson in depth even if it breaks his army. The obvious question is: where would he get a new one? ISW again, emphasis mine:
Russian military recruitment and enlistment centers continue to face challenges in incentivizing Russians to sign military service contracts. St. Petersburg-based outlet Fontanka reported that military-aged men (some as old as 49 years of age) began receiving letters and calls ordering them to show up in military recruitment centers to chat about contract service. Fontanka followed one of these men to the military recruitment center and observed that the officials required the man to sign a waiver stating that he is not interested in contract service. ISW has previously reported that Russian lawyers warned against responding to such letters and calls, as it is one way that Russian authorities coerce men into signing contracts.
Putin has done everything possible to fill out his depleted ranks using any bodies he could scrounge or impress without having to admit he has picked a real fight with a determined foe. Ukraine is not real to him, or to Russia. To declare a formal state of war would permit full mobilization, but it would also acknowledge Ukraine as a real country with a real army. Now it is too late for that.
Even if he broke down tomorrow and started raising conscript forces, Putin’s war is such a shitshow that no one wants to fight it. The urban centers are ready to balk at wartime drafts. Only higher contract salaries can attract anyone at all to fight this war for Putin right now, and they can only work so well, for so long.
Matters have already progressed past the point of no return. At this rate, Russia may not have an army left by the end of the year. Ukraine is now putting western training and weapons into action, right alongside their eclectic ad hoc collection of technicals and converted civilian machinery, faster than Russia can supply men to use all of the tanks and planes and guns they have in storage. The window of possibility for Russian victory is closed. The final depth of their defeat is yet to be determined.