The Kherson Fire Sack Cinches Tighter

Progress is visible from space

The entire right bank of the Dnipro lies within range of Ukrainian artillery, which has throttled Russian logistics by destroying the bridges across the river, turning this half of Kherson Oblast into what US Army artillerists call a “fire sack.” For their own war with Russia, the Finns called it a motti, their word for a cord of firewood. Early setbacks for Russian columns stuck on the highways to Kyiv resembled the Finnish strategem of light troops on skis. However, Ukraine heads into the fall with a conventional army using precision fires to reduce the Kherson motti, potentially breaking the Russian Army.

The Kyiv Independent @KyivIndependent

⚡️Estonian official: Ukraine will be able to kick Russians out of Dnipro's right bank in 2 months. Kaupo Rosin, head of Estonia's cyber command, said on Sept. 5 that Ukraine's military is trying to exploit Russia's weaknesses in logistics and management.

Ukrainian information discipline has prevented much real news from getting out of Kherson just yet. However, enough recovered villages have been named in the press that the location of the main effort in the north has become plainly apparent. Moreover, using the NASA FIRMS system, we can observe the Ukrainian artillery fire plan shifting in 48-hour phases over the last week consistent with vague reports of a breakthrough and rout of Russian forces there.

A torrent of Russian propaganda memes has purported to “prove” that Ukraine was being defeated in Kherson since the moment this offensive began last Monday. To be fair, Ukraine has a propaganda A-game as well. But a fire plan does not lie. It is difficult to fabricate, a truth distilled into explosions.

One caveat: FIRMS cannot detect the reason for a fire, only the existence of a fire, so Ivan burning off his garbage pit will look the same to NASA as a burning tank. Also, even if we did know that a certain fire was in fact a burning tank, we do not know which side it was on, and the system cannot tell us whether it was an artillery shell, a loitering munition, or a shoulder-fired missile that did the deed.

A Fire Plan Does Not Lie

What you see below is aggregate data, a metaphorical forest of unidentified trees. These are snapshots of three successive 48-hour periods from last week. After the opening bombardment and destruction of Russian forces, the fire plan shifted outwards, presumably to interdict counterattacking Russian columns, or soften up points of resistance along axes of Ukrainian advance, or else Ukrainians took hits in the advance.

By Friday, the fires had shifted again, suggesting that Russians were withdrawing rather than get trapped against the Dnipro, among the streams and swamps.

There are two main roads running the length of Kherson. According to sources familiar with the regional transportation infrastructure, the southern road (T0403) is unimproved for long stretches, and its bridges that cross the creeks running to the Dnipro are vulnerable to Ukrainian rocket artillery.

Of course, that will not stop foot traffic from wading across where a bridge is broken, but it certanly inhibits vehicles, such as the trucks needed to supply any Russian troops organizing a new line of defense. No such second effort has been reported or detected, either, which is suggestive of a general rout from the northern end of the fire sack — and indicates that no second line of defense was prepared in the north in anticipation of Ukraine’s counteroffensive.

The shaded area is Ukrainian tube artillery range. Source

Running almost due north from Nova Kakhovka, where the dam bridge has been destroyed, the T2207 highway is a good road that passes through Davydiv Brid due north, then bends east towards the northern end of Kherson. A significant Ukrainian attack threatening this logistical lifeline would divert available supplies against the more immediate threat, away from the north and Ukraine’s main effort. Russian milbloggers say that their tactical aviation fire has been concentrated here instead of the north, too. So even though they report very different results, both sides confirm an operation has been underway here, and that it has affected Russian combat power elsewhere.

Again, we have FIRMS data to examine. Again, the story of an offensive — this one a breakthrough pincer movement — is told in the fires, seen from space, mostly of vehicles from both sides burning in the wake of battle. Again, this is a series of three 48-hour takes, which is the right “shutter speed” for most offensive artillery fire plans. Ukrainian casualties were likely to be heavy here. However, the threat to the roadway apparently drew off enough combat power to ensure success in the north. The plan seems to have worked.

None of this is definitive or determinative. It is just open source reporting from both sides, which might otherwise be easily fabricated or spun in isolation, that we can corroborate through a separate open source of information that would be difficult to fabricate or spin, to produce a changing picture over time. Neither side is a clear victor just yet. However, Ukraine has the stronger position, and the picture we do have is consistent with an operational defeat of Russian formations through attrition by fire plan.

One week ago, “shaping operations” were announced with great fanfare. Videos of Ukrainians in the advance do not show a lot of forward motion, rather they seem to indicate a careful, disciplined approach towards Russian positions. As I wrote last Wednesday, the “shape” of the Kherson fire sack is flexible, like a canvas duffel bag with a VDV paratrooper stuffed inside it, and the idea is to beat him with a stick until he stops struggling. The duffel bag has been cinched in the middle to provide further discomfort, stress, and strain to the occupant.

Ukraine Has An Attrition Strategy of Their Own in Crimea and Kherson

Take note that Crimea is another potential fire sack — a place where Russian forces are easily isolated, cut off, and potentially defeated without the bloody frontal assaults that characterize Russian operations in Donetsk. Kyiv sees this campaign in Kherson as the model for the next phase of their war. Moreover, because Russia reinforced Kherson by withdrawing forces from the east, local Ukrainian counterattacks are already succeeding in Donetsk, too.

The pace is picking up, little by little, while Moscow continues to deny that Russians are even fighting a real war at all. Without a major correction, including a real wartime mobilization in Russian cities, these trend lines will end at a very real, and historic, defeat for Russian arms.