Russian Army Resorts To Donkey Logistics

Technological backsliding indicates casualties will rise

Your mileage may vary according to size and temperament, but as a rule of thumb, the average donkey can carry about 110 lbs (50 kg), a little more than the combat load of a modern soldier. In a self-sustaining ‘donkey park,’ one animal can carry enough bundled straw or hay for four donkeys for four days. A donkey-dependent logistical chain thus begins with inefficiencies that do not exist in motor transport. One fuel tanker can supply an entire motorized company for a day’s operations.

Donkeys only become efficient logistical animals when you have run out of motor vehicles. Ukrainian drone operators regularly strike un-armored Russian vans, cars, and motorcycles being used for logistics beyond the line of contact. The appearance of donkeys on the Russian side of the battlefront indicates a severe shortage of military machinery consistent with the trend of civilian vehicles being deployed in assaults on Ukrainian positions, with predictable rates of vehicle loss.

Russian soldiers began posting videos of the donkeys assigned to them in recent days, confirming rumors that had run through the ranks. There are now too many videos and images from too many locations for this to be some sort of strange joke or disinformation campaign. “If the individual photos could be perceived as a throw-in, then now there is no doubt,” said the Vodogram channel on Telegram.

“The guys in one of the directions were given a donkey for logistics. A real donkey,” the Zhyvov Z channel wrote under the photo posted above. “A regulation military donkey. The guys shared and accompanied the story with a mass of colorful epithets. When I joked about horses, bows, arrows and catapults at the beginning of the [special military operation], I was probably not joking.”

The animals seem to be kept in improvised pens built from scratch with waste materials, apparently close to the front line. “If he is kidnapped by an enemy sabotage and reconnaissance group, will he be considered missing in action or a prisoner of war?” the Two Majors channel asks. “And what if they give birth to donkeys? Are they regimental or state?”

A month ago, just four days into the new year, the Institute for the Study of War noted that “Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed or damaged over 3,000 Russian tanks and almost 9,000 armored vehicles in 2024,” a loss rate that is “likely unsustainable in the medium-term.” Altogether, Ukrainians destroyed more vehicles in 2024 than in 2022 and 2023 combined.

“That’s far too many for Russian factories to replace,” David Axe writes at Forbes under a video of two Russian soldiers patrolling on horseback. Manufacturing simply cannot keep up. “Russia builds maybe 200 new BMP-3 fighting vehicles and 90 new T-90M tanks annually as well as a few hundred other new armored vehicles, including BTR-82 wheeled fighting vehicles.” Russia has relied on enormous Cold War stocks of vehicles to make up the shortfall, but now they are running out.

Defense Express, a Ukrainian website, suggests that donkeys are an adaptation to “the activity of Ukrainian UAVs in the frontline zone” that “has created a ‘gray zone’ several kilometers deep from the line of contact, where no transport can safely pass.”

Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense had never entirely given up on animal transport to begin with. When Russian forces began their new invasion of Ukraine in 2022, “at least two units of the Russian army officially had pack vehicles at their disposal — the 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade from the 41st Combined Arms Army of the Central Military District, and the 34th Separate Motorized Rifle Mountain Brigade from the Southern Military District.”

However, both units were trained and equipped for mountain warfare rather than the kind of war Russia is fighting in Ukraine. Furthermore, no major outlets are blaming a more likely factor for the emergence of pack animals in formations: the emerging Russian manpower shortage.

Commensurate with the horrendous vehicle losses of 2024, Ukraine inflicted more casualties on Russia last year than the previous two years of war. In just the last three months, Russian dead and wounded have averaged 1,500 per day. Contract recruitment in the urban centers had noticeably declined in December and declined 80 percent by the end of January, year-on-year. Half of all applicants are now foreigners, mainly from Asia and Africa. Prisoner service has been extended. Recruitment has barely covered losses.

As Russian generals first experienced shortages of armor and constant drone observation of the front in eastern Ukraine during the summer of 2022, they adapted by breaking the infantry of their brigade formations into smaller units. This trend accelerated during the Wagner-led offensive on Bakhmut. Russians would advance to the zero line in groups as small as two at a time so as to be less inviting targets. Assembled groups would then rush the Ukrainian position to reveal the location of defenders. Wagner fighters with better tactics and weapons would then follow on the first attack.

By the time Avdiivka fell, the ‘meatwave’ infantry assault featured wave after wave of small teams. These tactics were inherently attritional, and the attrition increased every year. Simultanous high attrition rates of Russian armor, especially troop carriers such as BMPs and BRDMs, has led to the present state in which trucks are sacrificed to bring troops to the zero line and units construct makeshift troop transports out of tanks. Trucks, of course, are the primary logistical device of the mechanized battlefield.

As Russia ran out of machines, the Kremlin chose to increase the wastage rate of their manpower — and also, other machines less suited to warfare, even golf carts. Civilian vehicles now account for most Russian vehicle losses in Ukraine. Unconcerned for the life of the soldier, the Ministry of Defense happily sends him to attack the Ukrainians on a scooter.

In November, Russian units in Donetsk were reportedly anxious that Russian commanders intend to confiscate their private vehicles, which they say account for 70-80 percent of non-armored vehicles at the front. Many of these were purchased with unit funds or soldiers’ salaries.

As seen in this video, one Russian soldier can supervise a small number of donkeys grazing in open pasture, or lead a team of them on a rope to resupply a unit. Normally, leg infantry without motorized means of transport would resupply a forward unit by carrying packs full of food, water, ammunition, etcetera on their backs, returning empty. Because of the vehicle shortage, plus the manpower shortage, donkeys are replacing soldiers who would otherwise carry the load.

It remains to be seen how widespread the donkey trend becomes, but it portends even higher Russian casualty rates for 2025. If the daily average approaches 2,000 dead and wounded, recruitment will not keep pace with losses. Russian armor stocks appear to be running out: any fighting vehicle still sitting on a lot is almost certainly deadlined, fit only to be cannibalized for parts. Unless the war ends by summer, foreign-born troops could end up riding into battle on Russian donkeys.

Since the February 2022 invasion, I have maintained that poor Russian logistics prohibit Russian military victory in Ukraine. I enjoy being right, so I am extending the FLASH SALE on annual subscriptions for an additional 24 hours.