Russia Is Losing Mali The Same Way They Lost Afghanistan
Weekend rebel offensive resonates with the history of the Red Army in central Asia
Malian rebel forces opened a coordinated offensive this weekend with decapitation strikes that killed the Minister of Defense, General Sadio Camara, and forced Russian mercenaries to abandon a base at Kidal. Camara was the Malian leader who replaced French troops with Africa Corps, the retitled Wagner Group, in 2023.
The two rebel groups are Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an Al Aeda offshoot, and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), which consists of Tuareg tribesmen. The Islamic State also has a presence in the east of the country and will likely benefit from a collapse of the central government.
Kidal is the first city to fall to rebel forces since 2013, when French troops arrived to shore up the government in Operation Serval. They left in August 2022 at the request of Camara, presumably because Russian mercenaries were willing to participate in atrocities alongside FAMa forces. Russian and Malian troops retook Kidal in 2023, making its recapture a heavy blow to the prestige of both.
Recent government infighting has weakened the state. Camara was at odds with Gen. Assimi Goïta, the president of Mali, but Camara survived purges of officers loyal to him and was restored to his office during a February cabinet shakeup. Goïta apparently survived the attempt on his life this weekend and is reportedly surrounded by special forces troops now.
Africa Corps has approximately 2,000 mercenary contract soldiers in Mali and says they were outnumbered 6 to 1. Mali pays the former Wagner Group $10 million a month for security. The withdrawal from Kidal was negotiated under heavy pressure. As the Russian column departed for Tessalit, they left their local FAMa (Forces Armées Maliennes) allies behind.
Rebels reportedly used drones as well as vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIEDs) in their attacks. JNIM was repelled from the capital Bamako, but not until after wreaking destruction and capturing equipment. FAMa and Africa Corps repelled attacks in the center and south of the country after hard fighting and an assist from Turkish-made drones. Airbases at Gao, Sévaré, Kati, and Bamako remain in government hands.
Africa Corps has been surprised in Mali before. A group called the Permanent Strategic Framework for Peace, Security and Development (CSP-PSD) ambushed Wagner mercenaries in the July 2024 Battle of Tinzaouaten, killing dozens of Russians and downing a helicopter. Another Wagner/Africa Corps helicopter was reportedly shot down and its aircrew killed near Goa this weekend.
Mali formed an Alliance of Sahel States (AES) with Burkina Faso and Niger in 2023. All three nations left the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union to form a united bloc. Niger also forced the United States to leave a drone base in that country.
American sanctions against Mali have crushed the local economy. Sanctions against Camara and two other senior officials linked to Africa Corps were lifted in March as part of a rapprochement with the Malian government. However, the coordinated attacks this weekend are likely going to devastate trade as the deteriorated security situation will deter investment. Gold, cotton, and livestock are the chief exports. Access to the gold mines is a key part of the Africa Corps contract.
It remains to be seen whether JNIM and FLA can sustain their cooperation, but their weekend success is a bad sign for Russian involvement. Moscow appears to be repeating the errors of Afghanistan, where eight different groups of mujahideen fighters managed to coordinate their battlefield movements and international contacts in a successful bid to drive out the Soviet Union.
Also like Afghanistan, Russian engagement has failed to deal with any of the grievances that sustain insurgency. Participation in massacres has instead inflamed ethnic tensions and exacerbated political divisions. Carving out AES from ECOWAS has also left Mali cut off from regional support and intelligence partnerships that could give warning of Islamist intentions. Africa Corps has clearly underestimated the strength and capabilities of insurgent groups.
Most telling of all, Africa Corps has not even tried to control the territory of Mali. Their numbers are far too small, only enough to defend the regime itself. As Zineb Riboua notes, Wagner had greater success with “sustained disinformation operations to delegitimize France as a credible counterterrorism partner” than the defense of the regime in Bamako through propaganda.
Russian information operations this weekend focused on “paper[ing] over this de facto withdrawal by manufacturing the perception of Malian junta competence and military momentum”, Riboua writes. If the jihadis smell blood, they may very well escalate their attacks, threatening the system with breakdown. Afghanistan proved that no matter how systematic and sophisticated Russia’s information warfare gets to be, military victory cannot be worded into existence.
Africa Corps will either have to reinforce its remaining bases, drawing resources away from Ukraine, or else watch as another foreign ally goes under. Vladimir Putin has survived the loss of Syria and Venezuela; he now faces the loss of Iran and Cuba. To lose Mali as well would be catastrophic, perhaps even too much failure for the siloviki to tolerate.
Nor should we be too quick to celebrate Russia’s loss. A runaway Islamic State in the Sahel region would be a disaster for humanity, expose the southern flank of Europe to Islamist aggression, and likely make the Mediterranean refugee problem worse. Mali seems unimportant, but has probably never mattered this much before.
Probably the biggest difference between Mali and Afghanistan is how fast desert warfare can be compared to the hill-fighting that drained the Red Army. There are reports today that Africa Corps has lost more bases and the government is in crisis, so the situation could go downhill very quickly.