It looks fast because it is fast. It is just about the size of an early jet fighter. Known to NATO as the SA-5 Gammon, the S-200 surface-to-air Angara missile has four booster rockets that drop away after a few seconds of flight. Then the main motor reaches speeds of Mach 4, or about 3,000 miles per hour (4,900 km/hr). Designed in 1959, both the rockets and the radar that guides them are still in use today. A number of countries operate the S-200, including former Soviet clients and Warsaw Pact states, such as Poland.
Ukraine had an arsenal of S-200 missiles when Russian forces attacked in 2022, and like any SAM, it can be repurposed against ground targets. Some of them have reportedly been used to strike the Kerch bridge. As I pointed out in December 2022 in a tongue-in-cheek speculative post, it was already clear that Ukraine had something with near-hypersonic speed that they were using against time-sensitive strategic targets. It stands to reason that Kyiv would turn to their partners and a ready western market for support in getting the most out of a limited supply. It’s how they roll with their rockets.
Poland, Ukraine’s immediate neighbor as well as an emerging NATO power in the east, still uses the S-200 system. In fact, it is their only long-range SAM system. And it does have quite a long range.
After an upgrade program between 1999 and 2002, “the immense effective coverage of this SAM system was larger than half of the territory of Poland,” according to a 2021 historical paper describing the program. “The S-200C Vega SAM” — their designation for the upgraded system — “has a striking range of 250 km, which is the longest of all antiaircraft systems used by the Polish Air Force.”
Notably, “the S-200C Vega is intended to combat strategic targets or targets of tactical value (including air-to-surface missile carriers, electronic warfare and C2 aircraft, early warning and strike aircraft guidance stations, or flying tankers), operating at up to 1,200 m/s (in approach) and up to 300 m/s (in departure), at altitudes between 300 m and 41 km.” For example, in the event of war with Russia, Poland could potentially use the system to shoot down A-50U Beriev airborne early warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft that are still far inside enemy territory.
You know, the way Ukraine just did a couple of weeks ago? The Poles would do that.
In fact, a recent spate of Ukrainian shootdowns of Russian aircraft has reportedly resulted in a substantial reduction in the number of glide bombs being hurled at Ukrainian lines by Russian aviation and the grounding of Russia’s remaining A-50 fleet, which is reportedly just five planes now. Some of these shootdowns led to speculation that F-16s were already secretly flying in Ukrainian skies, shooting long-range air-to-air missiles, but this was soon ruled out. Instead, the consensus of informed opinion has ascribed the shootdowns to Patriot missile batteries.
But the recent A-50 shootdown was seen over Krasnodar, a Russian city which is roughly 120 miles (200 km) from the nearest Ukrainian-held territory, far beyond Patriot range. Soon, the buzz was about an S-200 missile. So what if some, most, or who knows, even all of these recent shootdowns were accomplished with upgraded missiles, a la Polish S-200 Vegas?
Having read a report, “The Tactical and Technical Functioning Conditions of the S-200C Vega Missile System on the Modern Battlefield,” which was published in 2021 in the journal Safety & Defense, I suspect that Poland has indeed supplied expertise and material support to Ukraine in order to upgrade their S-200 arsenal. Call it an educated hunch.
First, Kyiv would certainly want Warsaw’s help, and they would need it. There are “specific and covert properties which are critical to the efficient functioning of the entire SAM system: a set of radar signals, encryption of radio control commands, or the operating conditions for the SAM on-board instruments … achieved by ‘proprietary Polish conversion’ of the key retrofit solutions, making certain sensitive performance parameters of the S-200C Vega known to the Polish military and defense sector only.”
The rockets themselves have held up surprisingly well. “Over many years of operation, the mechanical components of the SAMs were found to age at a negligible rate, and this is particularly true of the propulsion and aerodynamic components,” the report says. Replacing the vacuum tube guidance system electronics with digital processors saved some weight, increased performance, and allowed software upgrades. Because the missile was designed to carry a tactical nuclear warhead or a 478-lb (217kg) conventional explosive warhead, a sensible engineer could save further mass with a new, smaller warhead, taking advantage of the increased accuracy of the system, in order to extend the missile’s range.
A few more potential improvements might be available in Poland. For example, they could add NATO active radar sensors, so that the missile homes in on its target by itself. Older S-200 rockets have passive radar sensors that detect the signal return from the target, relying on the ground station to illuminate it. This hack would allow the S-200 operators to minimize their own radar sweeps and reduce their exposure to enemy fire.
As can be seen in the photo above, the S-200 was not designed for high mobility. It was always intended for a temporary installation in close proximity to its guidance radar and command and control components. “The main drawback was the lack of the autonomous combat mission capability of the S-200WE, which prevented the territorial separation of the individual SAM system sites,” according to the paper. It was one of the things they fixed in the upgrade, adding some tactical flexibility to the system. Everything could be spread out and linked by modern radio signalling equipment.
The target illumination radar (TIR) consists of two “cabins” and a control tower. The 5N62 “Square Pair” tracking radar still uses electron tubes in the receivers, which have the advantage of “highly dynamic performance” despite being utterly obsolete. Because it uses continuous radiation instead of pulsed transmission, the system “provides a stable load on the microwave transmitting hardware, which dramatically improves its reliability.”
As can be seen in the above photo, however, the K1 cabin is not the most mobile platform. Breaking one of these systems down to secure it for movement takes longer than a few minutes. If the enemy has triangulated your radar’s location and sent a radar-homing missile after you, there will not be time to move out of the way. Survival thus dictates that the missile operators get a fix on the enemy and shoot first.
Luckily for the Ukrainians, their enemy is the VVS (Russian Air Force). The reader may have noticed that despite what ought to be overwhelming numerical superiority, the VVS has utterly failed to establish actual air superiority in Ukraine after two years of war. This is a credit to superb performance by Ukrainian air defense radar operators and a discredit to Russian command and control. Whereas the electronic battlefield has varied by time and place, Ukrainian airspace denial has never waned, thanks to radar superiority.
Deterred by heavy losses in the early days of the 2022 invasion, Russian pilots have only delivered close air support and missile fire from standoff range ever since. An upgraded S-200C Vega-type battery would allow Ukrainian air defense to defend an area “half the size of Poland.” Aggressively placed near the front lines, an S-200 can shoot down Russian aircraft from standoff range, beyond their responsive reach.
The Poles greatly improved the command and control functions of this Cold War beast. Operators now have continuous observation of the target speed and vector. “Particular attention was given to improving the SAM system’s immunity to various electronic jamming strategies by applying effective digital methods for signal processing,” the paper says. “The technical performance was markedly improved, resulting in the enhancement of combat characteristics of the SAM system.” It is even more jamming resistant than it was. Most importantly, the TIR does not give its position away by guiding the missile, anymore.
If Ukraine had a Vega-upgraded battery located somewhere in Zaporizhzhia, it would be able to reach 120 miles (200 km) to Krasnodar and shoot down a Russian A-50. An A-50 crew will probably know they are being illuminated by the TIR and they will likely be aware of the missile launch. Of course, in that scenario, Ukraine would want to use at least two missiles, since flares can distract infrared seekers and chaff can distract radar seekers. So then a successful intercept might look something like this:
Patriot missiles are expensive, and the United States is a fickle partner. Upgrading Ukraine’s existing S-200 inventory makes economic and practical sense. It is unclear how many S-200 missiles Ukraine has, but they ought to be available on the global arms market. Perhaps Poland has some to spare. I will keep an eye out for further information.
H/t