Gen. Retreat: The Fine Art of Spin During the Collapse Phase of Authoritarian Debacles
Gen. Retreat: The Fine Art of Spin During the Collapse Phase of Authoritarian Debacles
Dissonance and defeat doctrine
Gen. Retreat: The Fine Art of Spin During the Collapse Phase of Authoritarian Debacles
The more personal power one person tries to impose over a very large system at one time, the less capable service that system delivers under stress. Contrary to their reputation, most autocrats are in fact very bad at making trains run on time, or even at all, and under stress an authoritarian train system will often break down completely.
Lt. Gen. Igor Konashenkov (see above meme) does not hold any real power in Russia. A professional holding a bad hand, Konashenkov puts on his poker face and bluffs. He is an example of the service that Vladimir Putin receives from his Ministry of Defense during the epic defeat unfolding in Ukraine. Putin is a gambler. He wants to double down.
Personal advancement within a system of autarkic power requires a severe mental self-discipline, a comfort with cognitive dissonance. For example, during March, Major General Konashenkov was able to keep a straight face while claiming that the United States has a secret training program for birds(!) to spread influenza in Russia(?). This was silly, of course, but he was promoted for this stunning achievement in nonverbal noncommunication.
Now the duty has fallen on Lieutenant Gen. Konashenkov to explain why the Russian army has abandoned Kharkiv Oblast. For his next trick, Konashenkov will call the Russians fleeing the right bank of the Dnipro and Kherson City this very hour a “goodwill gesture.” Ukrainians are apparently struggling to meet the challenge of processing tens of thousands of prisoners, which the general will probably call a “successful evacuation” or something. You see how this works.
Confused Telegram reporting over the last 48 hours would have everyone in Russia believe that Ukrainians are attacking everywhere, all at once. To the extent that Russians are still falling back in chaos across a broad front, with Ukrainians following close on their heels, this is probably true, though local mileage will surely vary. Confusion seems to reign in Russian units driving east through Luhansk, some reportedly all the way to the international boundary. Unsure of their flanks, falling back towards their logistics, Russians fear encirclement and recoil at contact rather than fight to stop the Ukrainian advance.
It is difficult to stablize a situation like this one without significant reserves, which Russia does not have, or air superiority, which Russia has lost. The entire Russian position in Ukraine now depends on a much longer logistical chain than it did one week ago. Hasty Russian redeployments reported today suggest a belated strategy to withdraw further in the northeast and reinforce the southern direction, where a Ukrainian breakthrough would further threaten their rail logistics.
It has taken Moscow six days to figure out a countermove for the Kharkiv offensive and it is still not quite organized, but of course everything is still going according to the plan. No matter what happens now, it will happen according to the plan. No one will say precisely what the plan is, because the plan will have to change every time Ukraine wins another batttle, but the plan definitely exists and everything is proceeding according to that plan. See how that works?
Defeat is the hardest test of military organizations. Doctrine and training matter most when the direction of the battle is at its worst. For example, the Code of Conduct instructs every US Army private in how to act if they should be taken prisoner, i.e. defeated in battle. An army cannot assume they will always win a victory all the time — local defeat is inevitable in war, especially a war of attrition. Realistic training scenarios take this into account: You were defeated in this exercise today, commander. Now how will you withdraw? Is your staff prepared to organize a new line of defense? And so on.
In its current form, Russian defeat doctrine first denies the very possibility of defeat, even while standing neck-deep in defeat. No matter what happens next, everything is going according to plan and forces are “regrouping,” not retreating. Ukraine is to be given no agency in making these events transpire. They are not a real country, with a real army, full of real Ukrainians who really oppose Russian aggression. No such official admission is possible in the “special operation.”
The leadership is always flawless. This is the first rule of Russian defeat doctrine.
Second, state-of-the-art Russian defeat doctrine calls for strikes on civilian targets with zero military value. Upon every wthdrawal — Kyiv, Snake Island, Kharkiv, and now the oblast — Moscow has hit Ukrainians from a distance, often targeting apartment blocks. During the last 24 hours, Russia used submarine-launched cruise missiles to hit electrical stations in Ukraine. Ukrainians have reportedly restored power to most areas, but Russophiles have treated this flailing fusilade as a great strategic blow anyway.
Third, Konashenkov imitates(?) an android. This is not strategy at work. This is cope. Angry, infantile cope. Here are Boris Nadezhdin and Victor Olevich, two very brave Russians, asking a news panel to accept the unacceptable, that Ukraine exists and Ukrainians want to fight Russia. No one can really explain how they are wrong, but everyone else on the panel is sure that the “special operation” must continue, no matter what.
Dissidence introduces dissonance. Dissonance is rationalized into arrogance. Dispiriting comments are not allowed, so no one can actually say that the special operation has “failed” or that Ukraine is “winning.” Realistic analysis is unwelcome, outrageous, impolite.
To repeat: presented with defeat, the Russian response is to first deny, then lash out in anger, and then hold a verbal bargaining session on television. Nothing is resolved. Russian political discussion remains trapped in a disfunctional avoidance of normal, healthy fulfillment of a Kubler-Ross cycle, not allowing reflection that might avoid further defeats. It leaves Russians brittle. Absence of real information from the Ministry of Defense undermines confidence in the regime more than any street protest.
Realistically, there is little the MoD can do to stop Ukraine just yet in the east, and Russians are now supremely vulnerable to an offensive in the south aimed at cutting the “land bridge” to Crimea, too. Frantic defensive redeployments are underway while whole formations remain scattered. There is too much Ukraine now, and there are too few Russians, to allow for large-scale Russian offensive action.
It is very unlikely that things will get better from here, so the idea is to seem in control of events, no matter how silly it looks, until the thing is done and complete victory can be declared at last. As long as Putin is in charge, a victory will be declared, no matter what happens. Count on it. The rewards are real. Just ask Gen. Konashenkov if you don’t believe me.
What. A. Shit. Show!