Electronic Preparation Of The Battlefield Heralds Arrival Of The F-16s In Ukraine
Why it's okay to get a little bit excited
Seen above, the 55Zh6M Nebo-M radar complex consists of three radars and a command vehicle. Russian propagandists have touted the $100 million Nebo (lit. “sky”) as an anti-stealth radar. It does in fact have better detection range against stealth planes than most radar sets, but it only detects them, it does not target them. In electronic warfare, the difference is more than semantic. Nebo-M can see stealth aircraft from further off than previous tactical radar sets, but cannot shoot them down. Any surface-to-air missile battery — say, an S-400 complex — will have its own targeting radar to do the job of aiming the missile.
The RLM-M unit on the top right also has problems seeing through clouds, and despite being motorized, it is rather immobile in practice. Setup and takedown times are quite long. Furthermore, the realities of field life make operators lazy. The fuel tank in the generator on the RLM-D in the foreground has to be refilled frequently, so it is just easier to keep fuel cans in a convenient shed nearby and stay put, sleeping in a convenient barracks instead of a hole in the ground. Bear in mind that any signal which can be detected can also be targeted. There will not be enough warning time to tear down and move these antennas if an incoming attack is detected. Operators might only just have time to run for the nearest hole in the ground.
On the evening of 10 May, a Ukrainian-launched ATACMS missile took out a Nebo-M complex like this one. It was parked at the Luhansk aviation school airfield. Journalist Mark Krutov noted that it had been in place for at least seventeen days, judging from satellite imagery. “I haven't noticed many changes in the tracks in the field in the meantime,” he added. Area residents posted photos of the glowing flames from the strike. Maybe the highly-trained operators had holes in the ground to which they could sprint. Maybe not. This is the Russian army we are talking about, folks.
Scratch one Nebo-M and add it to the list of targets which Ukrainians have struck in recent weeks in order to establish a corridor of electromagnetic spectrum dominance over the Crimean Peninsula all the way over the Taman Peninsula. In a series of strikes, Ukraine took out Russian strategic early warning radars in Crimea, most importantly a fixed site on a mountain plateau, then sent streams of drones through the breach to hit other high-value targets. It was a textbook example of electronic battlefield preparation. Here is what I wrote about that campaign last week as part of my usual monthly update on EW matters.
As I explained in that update, the effect of F-16s properly armed for suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) and flown by trained pilots would be multiplied by Ukrainian control of the electromagnetic spectrum. That’s what EW is, a force-multiplier. A campaign to interdict all resupply and logistics routes into Crimea becomes feasible if Ukraine can establish air dominance over the peninsula. Thus we can safely assume this pattern of action is deliberate, and that it is aimed at preparing the battlespace for the imminent arrival of F-16s.
Two strikes stand out from this pattern, however. On 23 May, the same day I published that update, Ukrainians struck a Cold War-era Voronezh-M early warning radar complex at Armavir, near Krasnodar Krai, with drones. Like the “mobile” Nebo-M complex, this fixed site is an “over the horizon” radar. It uses the ionosphere to “bounce” VHF signals back to earth far away, over the horizon, and receive any return signals the same way. It therefore has very long detection range, which is useful when you are trying to spot incoming nuclear bombers or missiles. It was also not pointed at Ukraine, but at the Middle East.
Then on 26 May, a Ukrainian drone attacked another fixed Voronezh-M site in Orsk, Orenburg Oblast, almost 920 miles (1,800km) inside Russia, a new distance record for Ukraine. It is unclear right now whether the drone actually hit the target. Satellite photos suggest burned grass around the antennas, but the extent of any damage to the actual structure is unknown. Like the Armavir site, which is functionally similar, it does not point at Ukraine. Rather, it covers Central Asia and the Middle East.
Washington has “expressed concern” about these strikes. “A Ukrainian official familiar with the matter stated that Russia had been using radar stations to monitor the activity of the Ukrainian military, including Kyiv's use of aerial weaponry such as drones and missiles,” but I have my doubts. Neither the Armavir antennas nor the Orsk antennas were well-positioned to detect a fighter jet over Ukraine, let alone an ATACMS or a drone coming from Ukraine.
Clausewitz said that war is policy. This week saw Europe, as well as President Biden, change their minds about letting Ukraine strike militarily significant targets inside of Russian territory with western weapons. By hitting these strategic nuclear defense sites, Kyiv crossed a supposed “red line” of Vladimir Putin, risking escalation. When Putin did not start World War III, after all, it was obvious to Washington and Berlin that they could afford to take greater risks, such as greenlighting the use of F-16s to hit military targets inside Russia. See how that works?
This all-American penchant for fencing allies into untenable positions, carving out safe spaces for enemies based on boundaries which only appear on maps, has led to predictable absurdities. Russian S-300 missile batteries have been observed in open fields, covering Luhansk from blissful safety just a few meters across the international boundary. Getting the risk-averse regime in Washington to agree this is stupid, and must stop, is in fact an amazing achievement by Kyiv. If Ukraine refrains from striking any more Russian nuclear defense radars, it will strengthen my conviction that the Armavir and Orsk strikes were in fact aimed at National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan.
As noted above, the difference between “early warning radar” and “targeting radar” matters. If the F-16s are to contest all of occupied Ukraine, the precondition for liberating Ukrainian territory, the UAF will have to accept battle with Russian air defense systems in Russian territory. The less Washington tries to micromanage this battle, the more likely Ukraine will win it. As seen in the video below, recently a Ukrainian drone found a Russian S-400 system in a field near Mospyne. An ATACMS cluster munition was selected for this juicy target. The drone then captured the resulting duel between missile and missile battery. As you can see, the Russian crew fired off six interceptor missiles in a desperate bid to save their lives.
For context, the Block 1 M39 missile used to destroy this S-400 battery was developed in 1989. All the Block 1 M39s were judged obsolete, removed from the U.S. Army's inventory in 2020, and scheduled for destruction. Yet this obsolete Cold War weapon defeated the newest, best mobile air defense complex Russia has to offer the global arms market. Glossy brochure marketing by Russia’s defense industrial base has declared the S-400 to be “invincible” since they first produced it in 2007. Embarrassing!
Critics of the F-16 keep reminding us that it was designed and first flew in the 1970s. It isn’t stealthy. It isn’t good on rough runways. Doubters in the efficacy of F-16s for Ukraine point to Russian air defense as a threat, but something is clearly broken in Russian air defense, and there is no better time to take advantage of that. As Ukraine has consistently outperformed Russians with Russian air defense equipment, it seems unlikely that the problem is in the equipment. Human factors are probably to blame. Russia’s entire land army is incompetent, so why not this branch, too?
Yesterday, Sweden announced that they will give Ukraine two ASC 890 airborne warning and control aircraft. These are also force-multipliers. Based on the Saab 340 twin engine turboprop airframe, which some Ukrainian pilots are already rated to fly, these aircraft will give Ukrainian F-16 pilots early warning of inbound Russian planes or missiles. Two of these is not enough for 24/7 coverage. However, the active electronically scanned array (AESA) riding on its back can already link up with F-16s to provide real-time data from well behind the line of contact.
It is therefore okay to get a little bit excited about the F-16s. They are not a panacea, and they should be considered consumables, not collector’s items. But Ukraine appears to have created political conditions for their success and Kyiv has obviously prioritized their protection. Maybe we will even finally get to see something that slightly resembles combined arms warfare.