Seen here, Borisoglebsk-2 is an example of why I focus on soft factors and soft killers. Each one of these Russian systems costs a reported $200 million. In vehicular terms, it is roughly similar to the Ground Based Common Sensor-Heavy XM5 monstrosity the US Army tried to build in the 1990s. However, this was developed in the 21st century, when people knew better, taking twice as long to field than initially planned, and it is a jammer, not a sensor. Its doctrinal failures are therefore doublefold due to fundamental design flaws.
In the following video, we see a Ukrainian drone camera view of a Borisoglebsk-2 being destroyed with a drone munition. This is interspersed with archival video of the system in the field. There is a brief shot of the antenna mast being erected. The H-shaped dipoles are an Adcock direction finding antenna. Somewhat resembling an old TV aerial, the log periodic antenna (LPA) is the directional jammer. There appears to be an omnidirectional jammer at center and (I think) a GPS jammer antenna at the top of that. Analysis is below the fold.
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